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Purpose: In this study, we contribute to the existing literature by examining the relationship 
between military spending changes and economic growth in China over the period 1995 to 
2018 using Granger causality test. We would also explore short and long run relationship 
between GDP growth and military expenditure of China.  
Approach/Methodology/Design: Data used in this study are yearly data covering the period 
of 1995 to 2018 and the variables are Gross Domestic product (GDP) and Military 
Expenditure (ME). Data were collected from World Bank. GDP is at 2010  constant US 
prices and ME is expressed as a percentage of economic growth. All variables are 
transformed into the natural logarithmics to obtain growth effects. 
Findings: Using causality test, the causal relationship between the variables revealed that 
the alternative hypothesis should be accepted which is lagged GDP variable (proxy of 
economic growth) does not cause ME in our first VAR Granger causslity Wald test model. 
However, we discover and verified that there is one-way causality from economic growth to 
military spending, but no causality from military spending to economic growth is observed in 
this study. China’s positive economic growth can finance its military expenditure. 
Practical Implications: The study will contribute positively to the understanding of influence 
of GDP on military expenditure for emerging and developed ecconomies. 
Originality/value: This study innovates by using Cointegration, E-granger and Granger 
causality test to find out economic growth causing military expenditure in developing 
economies like China.  
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Global defense spending lessened from US$1,613 billion in 1988 to US$1,052 
billion in 1996 (Witko, 2003). However, in 2001 to 2012, there was a huge 
percentage increase in military expenditure worldwide: 51 percent increase from 
US$1,146 billion to US$1,733 billion (Szymanski, 1973). Most people consider 
research work on the effects of military expenditure and economic growth as weird. 
Effects of military spending are divided among two groups; the “pro” group that 
views military spending as a guarantee of peace, security and welfare, while the 
“against” group sees such spending as a wasteful enterprise that influences the 
economy beyond the resources it takes up. Military expenditure is consider as one of 
the non-developmental expenditure, expenditure of the government, which does not 
directly help in economic development of the country (Haseeb et al., 2014). 
 
There is remarkably large and growing literature on subject that reflects a continuing 
lack of consensus. As displayed by academics, there are several ways that military 
spending may affect the growth of a country (Henderson, 1998). Empirical findings 
have not produced a conclusive result. Conclusions are that the effect of military 
spending on economic growth may be negative, or positive, significant or 
insignificant (Aziz et al., 2017).  
 
The Keynesian income multiplier effect posits that military spending affects 
economic growth positively (Su et al., 2018), whereas crowding out hypothesis 
favors a negative growth impact of military spending (Zaman, 2019). Indeed, as 
there is no agreed theory of growth among economists, there is no standard 
framework to fit military spending. 
 
In this study, we contribute to the existing literature by examining the relationship 
between military spending changes and economic growth in China over the period 
1995 to 2018 using Granger causality test (World Bank, 2018). We would also 
explore short and long run relationship between GDP growth and military 
expenditure of China. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Most studies carried out during the 1960s and 1970s showed that military spending 
was more advantageous for financially wealthy countries than it was for less 
privileged countries (Goode, 2010). Menla and Dimittraki (2014) found positive 
effects of military spending on economic growth through the accumulation of human 
capital or derived technologies, while the view that military spending help in 
improving infrastructure and promoting full employment and the increase in 
aggregate Keynesian demand was found by Kenny (1983), Aziz and Asadullah, 
(2017), Kennedy (1983), Menla and Dimitraki (2014). Benoit hypothesis discovered 
a positive impact of defense expenditure on economic growth for a group of less-
developed countries (Benoit, 1978). 
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3. Empirical Analysis  
 
Primary study of the impact of defense spending on economic growth in Latin 
America, was suggested that the military burden hampered growth (Reitschuler and 
Loening, 2005). However, recent studies have shown that the relationship is positive 
(d’Agostino et al., 2016; Raju and Ahmed, 2019). According to Derouen et al. 
(2010) defense spending has both positive and negative effects on economic growth 
in Latin America, but there is no net positive effect.  
  
3.1 Augmented Solow Model 
The augmented Solow growth model was introduced by Mankiw et al. (1992) and 
used to measure the effect of military expenditure on growth by Knight et al. (1996). 
Augier et al., (2017) examined whether defense spending contributed to economic 
growth in China for the period 1952-2012. They examined the contribution of 
defense to economic growth using recently released official data on economic 
activity, defense and public spending. According to Solow's augmented model, a 1% 
increase in defense spending increases the rate of economic growth by about 0.15% 
to 0.19%.  
3.2 The Feder-Ram model  
Biswas and Ram (1986) adapted Feder's (1983, 1986) export-to-growth model for 
cross-country research on the effects of military expenditure and economic growth. 
Deger and Sen (1995) described the Feder-Biswas-Ram externality model as "an 
excellent empirical tool for investigating the impact of military expansion on 
economic growth." It is generally believed that this method provides a formal 
justification for single equation growth regression analysis that separates military 
expenditures as explanatory variables. This analysis is “rooted in neoclassical 
growth theory” (Mintz and Stevenson, 1995), or at least There is a sufficient 
foundation in the functional framework of neoclassical production ”(Biswas and 
Ram, 1986). According to Augier (2017), the Feder model does not seem to explain 
China's economic growth. 
 
3.3 Two-State Markow-Switching 
According to Menla and Dimitriki (2014), using  two state Markov-switching, the 
relationship between changes in military spending and economic growth depends on 
the state. According to their results, bearing in mind data from China in the period 
from 1953 to 2010, changes in military spending negatively affect economic growth 
during slower growth in higher variance state, while positively in faster growth state 
that has its variance low. Fritsche et al. (2019) in their work “Government Spending 
Multipliers in (Un)certain Times“ estimated the dynamic effects of government 
spending shocks, using probabilistic instruments that exploit time-varying volatility 
in US data. They concluded that the multiplier is significantly smaller when 
volatility is higher, consistent with theories predicting reduced effectiveness of 
surprise fiscal interventions in uncertain times.  
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3.4 GMM Technique 
Military spending is not seen as a productive activity that can make a positive 
contribution to GDP, but has an indirect effect in reducing risk and ensuring 
stability. Furthermore, as it is considered a major expense in many countries, it could 
indirectly affect the economy by also increase the level of income via production of 
military goods and services (Rahman and Siddiqui, 2019). The economy may grow 
with increasing military spending or vice versa. Rahman and Siddiqui (2019) 
explored the impact of defense spending on economic growth and per capita income 
in 85 countries over the past 20 years, from 1998 to 2017. We have used the GMM 
technique where the models of Rahman and Siddiqui (2019) suggested that the 
impact of defense spending on economic growth was negative because there was 
less money left to invest in other areas such as infrastructure, health, education and 
the production of everyday goods. However, they argue that if arms supplement a 
country's exports, defense spending becomes favorable to GDP. 
 
4. An Overview of China’s Growth and Defense Policies 
 
Although China represents over half the region’s spending, Russia remains the 
highest defense spender as a percentage of GDP and government spending. 
Moreover, the United States has the highest in terms of monetary value (Figure 1). 
However, we must understand that, not until 1949 China had a retarded due to 
budget weaknesses and a low rate of public spending (about 9% of national income). 
The current revival of interest in China’s defense spending and its military 
modernization needs to shed lit on the relationship between military spending 
policies and strategies and economic growth in China. 
 
Figure 1. Military expenditures by country  
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
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Considering the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, United States and 
China owns almost 50 percent of the total 2018 military expenditures in the world. 
Other country mentioning includes India, France and Germany. Critic wants to know 
the primary motivation of military spending changes of a country. There are lot of 
factors that can be cited. The factors can be group into two: internal and external 
factors. The estimated military strength of a potential enemy (if any), the country's 
geographical neighbors, economic constraints, end of conflicts, forced disarmament, 
and severe political changes. Other factors include as size of population, 
technological development and income from exportation of arms. Table 1, shows the 
general overview of some economic indicators of China. 
 
4.1 China’s Defense Budget  
China’s 2017 declared defense budget was CNY1tr (USD151bn) – a 2.1 percent real   
increase on the 2016 defense budget. In April 2017, China launched its first 
indigenously built aircraft carrier, with reports another two are planned for 
construction (Khanna, 2019). China launched its first of four Type-055 cruisers and 
the seventh Type-815A DONGDIAO-class auxiliary general intelligence ship, which 
was an improvement on the earlier Type 815. In July 2017, Russia announced it 
would deliver China an additional four Mi-171E helicopters in 2018. 
 
Table 1. Profile of China 
Country China 
Capital Beijing 
Population 1,437,731,640 (2020) 
Active armed forces 2,035,000 (2019) 
Reserve personnel 510,000 (2019) 
Land size 9,598,089 km2 (3,705,843 mi2) 
Currency RMB 
Fiscal year 1st January – December 31st 
Economy Socialist Market, Economy Industries- Includes, Iron 
Steel, Petroleum, Cement, Chemical fertilizers, 
automobiles electronics and telecommunications 
Income level Upper middle income 
Region East Asia & Pacific 
Soucre: World Bank, 2018. 
 
Over the past 10 years, Japan averaged 0.5 per cent annual real economic growth. In 
2017, the economy grew by 1.6 per cent, due to a strong recovery in Japanese 
exports. Japan’s economy is experiencing the longest stretch of continuous growth 
since the mid-1990s. However, a rise in global oil prices, coupled with slow wage 
growth, has reduced household purchasing power, suggesting consumer spending 
was not strong in 2017. Japan’s economy is forecast to average 1.2 per cent real 
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Figure 2. Multiply country analysis 
 
Source: World Bank, 2018. 
 
From Figure 1, two variables were used in the analysis for two countries military 
expenditure as percentage of GDP. We used the data of GDP growth as the indicator 
of economic growth and data of military expenditure as percentage of GDP as the 
value of military expenditure. The data of GDP growth rate is collected from the 
World Bank Data; (1995-2018) and the data of Military expenditure as a percent of 
GDP are collected from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI-
2018). Comparatively we can clearly state that the USA is ahead when it comes to 
the percentage of its GDP that they pump into the military.  
 
However, is not conclusive since many factors comes into play when dealing with 
security. The spending of United States rises, peaks at 2010 and falls thereof. In the 
contrary China has a steady growth. The likeliness observed in China military 
spending are similar of the one described in the international literature (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. The Model of Chinese Defense Expenditure 
  
Source: World Bank, 2018. 
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Analysis of Figure 3 shows that from the year 2000 there has been an increase in 
military spending in China. However, the number of army personnel keeps 
declining.  This suggest that the yearly declining in personnel does not match with 
the expenditure that the Chinese government does on its military.  
 
5. Methodological Procedures 
 
Suppose that one is interested in the question of whether or not a vector of economic 
time series yt ‘causes’ another vector xt. There will also exist a further vector of 
variables wt, which provides a context within which the causality question is being 
asked. With regards to this statement we performed the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) unit-root tests to determine the order of integration of the variables (Dickey 
and Fuller, 1981) and employed the Johansen test to estimate the possible long-run 
equilibrium relationship between these variable (Johansen and Juselius, 1990). 
Secondly, to investigate the long-run relationship between GDP growth and military 
expenditure we used Engle-Ganger Co-integration test. At last, Granger causality 
test is used to analyze the direction of the causal relationship between the variables 
(Granger, 1988).  
 
5.1 Empirical Model 
Prior studies suggest that economic growth affects military expenditure in countries 
like Turkey India, South Africa, and Ghana (Yusheng et al., 2020). We believe that 
ME can be affected by GDP in the case of China. We adopt the fundamental 
equation for this study as GDP=f(ME) where ME is a function of  GDP. GDP is the 
proxy for economic growth. The variables can be transferred into the logarithmic 
forms in order to capture impacts of growth as mentioned before. 
 
Therefore, the proposed model is InGDP =β0=β1 lnME+ε1 where at time t, lnME 
and lnGDP are the natural logs of military spending and real income respectively, εt 
represents the error term, Β0 is the constant coefficient which is the intercept of the 
equation and β1 is the coefficient of lnGDP and represents the slope of the equation. 
 
5.2 Unit Root Test 
We employ to widely used unit root tests namely Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), 
to determine the level of integration of the variable under investigation. Enders & 
Sandler (1995) handbook of defense economics suggests the most common model 
for unit roots with trends and intercept which is initial point of the analysis the 
following :   
                                               
                                      (1) 
 
where y is the dependent variable, is the drift, t is trend, ε is a Gaussian white noise 
and p represents the lag level. In order to ensure that the errors are white noise, the 
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number of lags “p” of the dependent variable should be determined by using the 
AKaike Information Criteria AIC or some other alternative criteria. ADF tests apply 
t-test for λ. The Null hypothesis of these tests is that the series is non-stationary. If 
the series is stationary at level 0 the series is called integrated of order zero, I(0). 
When the series is stationary at first differences, is called integrated of order one, 
I(1). 
 
5.3 Co-Integration Test  
In this part, the possible long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables is 
investigated. The present research is based on Johansen methodology that is used to 
test co-integration among variables having the same order of integration. Minimum 
one co-integrating vector is required in order to have co-integration between the 
variables. Johansen test takes its initial point in the vector auto regression (VAR) of 
order p given by: 
 
                         (2) 
                
where yt, yt-1…,yt-p are vectors of level and lagged values of p variables 
respectively which are I(1) in the mode; A1….,Ap are coefficient matrices with 
(PXP) dimensions; µ is an intercept vector, ε is a vector of random errors.  
 
Johansen and Juselius (1990) suggest that trace statistics are obtained by using Eigen 
values. The trace statistic (λtrace) could be estimated by the formula below: 
 
λtrace= -TƩLn (1-λt), i=r +1,…n-1                                                                           (3)                                                                      
 
The null hypotheses are given as follows; 
H0: v  =0              H0: v≥1 
H0: v≤=1              H0: v≥2 
H0: v≤=2              H0: v≥3 
One important limitation of Granger causality is that when X(t) is serially correlated, 
the impact of x(t-1) on y(t) will be simply a consequence of the impact. 
 
5.4 Granger Causality Test 
This test is performed in order to identify the direction of the causal relationship 
between ME and GDP. The casual relationships can be either unidirectional or bi-
directional. This test estimates the following equations assuming there is no 
correlation between ult and u2t.  
 
                      (4) 
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                                     (5) 
 
6. Analysis of Results 
 
Table 2 describes the main characteristics of the dependent, independent and control 
variables relating to the main hypothesis. The China’s economic growth is 
represented by its’s GDP and the military spending by a function of GDP. However, 
to bring these two variables into a common base for analysis purposes we found the 
natural logarithms of both variables. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 
2 and the unit root test of  Dickey-Fuller in Table 3. The variable of GDP  has an 
average value of 28.0114 and standard deviation 1.08812. The variable of ME has an 
average value of 24.8561and standard deviation of 1.0094. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
 Variables Observations Average Stand. Deviat Minimum Maximum 
gdpus1 24 28.0114     1.088122    26.43063    29.47913 
Mex 24 24.85619     1.009409     23.25746    26.24471 
gdpus 24 2.39e+12     2.09e+12    3.01e+11    6.35e+12 
ME 24 9.59e+10     8.11e+10     1.26e+10    2.50e+11 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Tabel 3. ADF test for Military expenditure 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root               Number of obs   =        23 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                   Test           1% Critical         5% Critical    10% Critical 
                   Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -0.610            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.8687 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
According to ADF, series are stationary at the first differences which means series 
are integrated of order one, (1). We perform Dickey- Fuller test to verify whether 
both variables are integrated on order 1 i.e., non-stationary in levels but stationary in 
differences. Using the ADF test we do not reject the null hypothesis of the unit root 
which means that military expenditure is non-stationary. This is because the ADF 
test statistic z(t) 0.610 does not surpass any of the value of the critical values in 
absolute terms. 
 
6.1 Co-Integration Analysis 
The general rule is that when two or more variable are co-integrate it means that they 
are individually non-stationary but a linear combination of those variables is 
stationary. We can infer that linear combination as a long-run study states 
equilibrium level. Any deviation from that level can be used to predict future 
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corrections using error correction models that take advantage of co-integration. We 
are looking at whether or not military expenditure is co-integrated with economic 
growth in general (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Engle-Granger test for Co-integration for both values 
Engle-Granger test for cointegration                  N (1st step)  =       24 
                                                      N (test)      =       23 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                  Test              1% Critical            5% Critical           10% Critical 
               Statistic                  Value                     Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -1.923               -4.415                     -3.615            -3.234 
Critical values from MacKinnon (1990, 2010) 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
From Table 4, the test statistic for our observations came with the correct critical 
values at 1%, 5% and 10% critical level. Engle-Granger test statistic value is 
significant at all levels. This verify the integration of the variables. This means that 
there is a long-term relationship economic growth and military expenditure. Table 5 
presents the Johansen test for cointegration. 
 
Table 5. Johansen tests for cointegration                         
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =      22 
Sample:  1997 - 2018                                             Lags =       2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                                                       5% 
            maximum                                     trace                   critical 
  rank    parms       LL        eigenvalue      statistic                 value 
    0          6       70.011502           .            9.5359*                15.41 
    1          9       73.505701     0.27215       2.5475                   3.76 
    2         10      74.779451     0.10934 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Looking at Table 5, after performing the unit root test, we found that all the series 
are stationary at their first differences. Thus, Johansen co-integration analysis is 
applied in order to check the possible long-run equilibrium relationship among 
variables. According to Johansen co-integration test, the null hypothesis that there is 
no co-integrating vector in the proposed model is rejected and concluded that there is 
at least one co-integrating vector. In other words, there is a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in China. Table 6 
presents the vector autoregression results. 
 
Table 6. Vector autoregression 
                  Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------           
         ME1  
         L1.    .9191522   .2041325     4.50   0.000     .5190598    1.319245 
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         L2.    .0137897   .1804146     0.08   0.939    -.3398164    .3673958 
         GDP  
         L1.    .5019792   .1292351     3.88   0.000      .248683    .7552754 
         L2.  -.4540113   .1270817    -3.57   0.000    -.7030868   -.2049357 
       cons  .3939915   .2367871     1.66   0.096    -.0701028    .8580858 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------         
         ME1  
         L1.    .2352342   .2992519     0.79   0.432    -.3512888    .8217572 
         L2.    .0954953   .2644822     0.36   0.718    -.4228804    .6138709 
         GDP  
         L1.     1.50882   .1894547     7.96   0.000     1.137496    1.880145 
         L2.|  -.8194506   .1862978    -4.40   0.000    -1.184588   -.4543136 
       _cons  .5144498   .3471226     1.48   0.138     -.165898    1.194798 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
In Table 6, per our VAR model-1 ME1 is the dependent variable and ME1 L1, ME 
L2,  GDPL1 and  GDPL2 are the independent variables.  The first null hypothesis is 
that whether GDPL1 and GDPL2 can cause military expenditure or not. Also, we 
analyzed whether in the second model where GDP is the dependent variable, our 
hypothesis is that ME1 L1 and ME L2 can cause economic growth (GDP). We took 
2 years lag of the variables to run our vector auto regression model with L1= lagged 
one period and L2=lagged two periods. Table 7 presents the Granger Wald causality 
test. 
 
Table 7. Granger causality Wald test 
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2| 
GDP Mex 5.9171      2 0.052     
GDP ALL 5.9171      2 0.052     
ME1 GDP 15.873      2 0.000     
ME1 ALL 15.873      2 0.000     
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Co-integration relationship between variables is confirmed by the Johansen method. 
Granger causality tests should be run in order to find the direction of the causal 
relationship among variables. Findings are shown in Table 7 showing that: 
 
A) The null hypothesis will be that lagged ME1 variable does not cause GDP. 
B) Alternative hypothesis will be that lagged ME1does cause GDP. 
 
From our analysis, the probability value is 5.2% greater than 5%. Therefore cannot 
reject  the null hypothesis. We accept the null hypothesis meaning that, lagged ME1 
variable does not cause GDP. That is military expenditure does not cause economic 
growth China. Furthermore, when consider both variables GDP and ME1 the 
probability value is 5.2% meaning that both lagged ME1 and lagged GDP do not 
cause economic growth (GDP) as a whole. 
 
Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in China 
  
 14  
 
 
However, in VAR model 2, the Granger causality Wald test null hypothesis will be 
that lagged GDP variable does not cause ME1. Alternative hypothesis will be that 
lagged GDP does cause ME1. By considering the probability value which is less 
than 5% we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis meaning 
that lagged GDP causes MEI. Also taking into account both variables at model-2, 




The purpose of this study is to investigate the causal relationship between military 
spending and economic growth in China using annual data from 1995 to 2018. Our 
empirical results indicate that military spending and economic growth have a long-
term equilibrium relationship. There is one-way causality from economic growth to 
military spending, but no causality from military spending to economic growth is 
observed in this study. There are several previous studies that contradict (Karagol, 
2006; Kollias and Makrydakis, 1997) and in agreement with our empirical findings 
(Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn, 2003). Although, given the lack of consensus in the 
literature on the causal relationship between military spending and economic growth, 
the conflicting results in the case of China are not surprising but still deserve a 
plausible explanation. One of the possible explanations for the contradictory results 
could be due to the different period of the studies. Our results can also be explained 
by the country's macroeconomic fundamentals. 
 
China still imports, although many arms are producing in China, is the world's sixth 
largest arms’ importer.  However, it has been a net arms’ exporter for many years in 
this decade. China's success flows from its massive investment in research and 
development (R&D) well over 2% of GDP. Therefore, with a higher GDP growth 
rate China can finance its military expenditures. 
 
It has been argued that apart from mainland, China has a critical geographical 
position and other administrative land under its protection such as Taiwan, Macuo, 
Hong-Kong, that should always be aware of the importance of military power and 
spend its resources to improve its military strength (Chao, 2003). Our findings reveal 
that economic growth does cause military spending of China. This finding implies 
that primary concern of the government should be to promote economic growth, 
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